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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from Ramiro Nevarez's judgment of conviction for robbery, in violation
of Idaho Code $3 18-6501, 18-6502(2), and 18-204.
B. Course of Proceedings
In the early morning hours of October 27,2006, an all-call from dispatch to law
enforcement officers reported that the Maverik convenience store in Rupert, Idaho, had just been
robbed. Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript (MS Tr.) pp. 25-26. Approximately eight miles
away, Joe Moore, a patrol deputy for the Minidoka County Sheriff's Office, wasin his patrol
vehicle finishing a meal and heard the call from dispatch. MS Tr. pp. 26-27. Responding to the
call, Deputy Moore activated his overhead lights and began traveling east toward Rupert on
Highway 25 at a high rate of speed intending to travel to the robbery location. MS Tr. pp. 27 &
29. Dispatch had advised Deputy Moore, and others, that the robbery suspects were two
individuals wearing hooded sweatshirts, bandannas, stocking caps, and perhaps canying a black
pistol. MS Tr. p. 27. Officer Moore also recalled being informed the two individuals were
probably Hispanic. MS Tr. pp. 28-29.
After traveling approximately half a mile, Deputy Moore decided to turn off his overhead
lights and slow his speed, yet continue traveling east toward Rupert. MS Tr. pp. 29-30. In doing
so, Deputy Moore began "checking vellicles" as they passed in the opposite direction. MS Tr. p.
30. Deputy Moore recalled passing two or three vehicles west of Paul, Idaho, and another within
the city limits of Paul. Id.

As he left Paul, continuing east toward Rupert, Deputy Moore observed another vehicle.
Apparently, this one caught his eye because, as it was approaching the City of Paul, it was
traveling 42 miles per hour even though the posted speed limit permitted 55 miles per hour. MS
Tr. pp. 3 1 & 34. Because it was dark and there was no other significant lighting in the area,
Deputy Moore believed he could maximize the light coming from a Texaco sign and the canopy
over some gas pumps at a nearby gas station in order to get a better look at the occupants of this
westbound vehicle. MS Tr. pp. 34-35. As a result, Deputy Moore slowed his vehicle to
approximately 35 miles per hour so he could "coordinate" the passing of vehicles. MS Tr. p. 34.
Even though the lighting was suspect and the two vehicles were passing each other at a
rate of 112.88 feet per second, Deputy Moore was able to observe what appeared to be four bald
headed Hispanic individuals in a "low-riding position," moving, turning, and looking around.
MS Tr. pp. 36-38,43, & 53. Deputy Moore then turned around and caught up to the four
individuals within approximately 40 seconds. MS Tr. pp. 38-39. By this point the vehicle had
properly slowed down in order lo comply with the 35 miles per hour speed limit zone it was
entering. MS Tr. p. 39. The vehicle then lawfully displayed its right blinker and moved into the
right lane as the two-lane highway became a four-lane road in the City of Paul. Id. The vehicle
continued westbound through Paul and lawfully signaled to turn right on Third Street. MS Tr. p.
46. At this point Deputy Moore "felt like [he] needed to check out" the vehicle. MS Tr. p. 46.
Deputy Moore engaged his overhead lights and effectuated a traffic stop. Id. Thereafter, the four
individuals in the vehicle were identified as Ramiro Nevarez, Arturo Flores, Logan Brizee, and
Marco ~imenez,and all four were eventually arrested for suspicion of robbery.

Mr. Nevarez filed a Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness pursuant to
Idaho Code § 19-852(a), seeking to retain the services of Marc Green, Ph.D. Record (R.) 104116. Mr. Nevarez, based upon Dr. Green's expertise as a spacial and visual expert, sought to
challenge the observations made by Deputy Moore in the early morning hours of October 27,
2006, and his assertion of reasonable suspicion warranting a traffic stop of Mr. Nevarez's
vehicle. Id. Mr. Nevarez contended the testimony of Deputy Moore was highly suspect and the
testimony of Dr. Green would provide essential information and assist the trier of fact in
ascertaining what in fact could have been and was observed by Deputy Moore. Motion for
Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness Hearing Transcript (AF Tr.) pp. 4-9. The State filed
an Objection to Defendant's Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness, arguing
publlc funds should not he expended and Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 precludes such testimony.

Following a hearing on March 9,2007, the Hon. Jolm Melanson issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order on Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness on March 26,2007, denying
Mr. Nevarez's motion. R. 131-138. Judge Melanson concluded:
The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what he observed at night while
passing each other and then througb his rearview mirror after the vehicles had
passed can, if necessary to decide this case, be determined by the court without the
assistance of an expert witness. It is the fact-finder's function to judge the
credibility of witnesses.
R. 137. Judge Melanson found the expenditure of funds was not required at this stage in the
proceedings. Id.
Subsequently, on April 16,2007, with the Hon. Barry Wood now presiding, a hearing
was held on Mr. Nevarez's Motion to Suppress. R. 140. At the conclusion of the hearing, in

which Deputy Moore was the only person to testify, Judge Wood denied Mr. Nevarez's motion,
upholdiilg the validity of the traffic stop by a "razor thin" margin. MS Tr. p. 79. Nonetheless,
Judge Wood encouraged Mr. Nevarez to appeal because the denial of his request for an expert
was by a different judge and he felt there was a lack of case law applicable to the facts presented.
MS Tr. pp. 74-80.
Mr. Nevarez entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal the district
court's denial of his Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness and his Motion to
Suppress. R. 173-176. This timely appeal follows. R. 198-200.
111. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Was it futldainentally unfair and thus a violation of Mr. Nevarez's constitutional and
statutory rights for the district court to deprive him of the expert services required to present an
adequate defense?
2. Was there a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the occupa~~ts
of the car were the

robbers of the store when they did not match the description other than by their ethnicity?
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The District Court Erred in Denyine Mr. Nevarez's Motion for Apportionment
of Funds for Expert Witness.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Nevarez's request for an expert
witness at state expense because in doing so it denied him hndalnental fairness as embodied in
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his right
to present evidence pursuant to the Sixth Amendment.

The decision to authorize the expenditure of state funds for an indigent defendant
generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395,
648 P.2d 203,207 (1982). In determilling whether the trial court abused its discretion, the
reviewing court often considers "whether the court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to its specific choices, and whether the
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558,758 P.2d
713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Standards of Appellate Review in State and Federal Courts,

5

3.4, IDAHO APPELLATE HANDBOOK (Idaho Law Fou~~dation,
Inc. 1985)).
1. Mr. Nevarez made a suflcient showing that the expert testimony was necessary in

order topresent an adequate defense to the prosecution's case.
As a11indigent defendant, Mr. Nevarez was entitled to the assistance of an expert witness
at state expense because it was necessary for the development of a significant element of his
defense. Alte v. Oltlahorna, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). As stated by the Ake Court:
This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power to bear
on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure that
the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense. This elementary
principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives fiom the belief that just cannot
be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his
liberty is at stake.
[Wlhile the Court has not held that a State must purchase for the indigent
defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy, it has often
reaffirmed that fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to "an adequate
opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system." To
implement this principle, we have focused on identifying the "basic tools of an
adequate defense or appeal," and we have required that such tools be provided to
those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them.

Analogous to the constitutional rationale sel forth in Ake, Idaho Code 5 19-852(a)(2)
provides:
(a) A needy person . . . who is under formal charge of having committed, or is
being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime, is entitled:

....
(2) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities of representation
(including investigation and other preparation). The attorney, services, and
facilities and the court costs shall be provided at public expense to the extent that
the person is, at the time the court determines need, unable to provide for their
payment.
In State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 394, 648 P.2d 203, 206 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court had the
opportunity to interpret section 19-852(a) and stated:
The statute recognizes that there are cases where a criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial may be jeopardized unless there is access not only to an
attorney, but also to certain specialized aid in the preparation of a defense. State
v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 838, 537 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1975). Included within the
scope of LC. 5 19-852(a) are the fourteenth amendment requirements of due
process and equal protection as they apply to indigent defendants. 111Britt v.
North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,227,92 S.Ct. 431,433,30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), the
United States Supreme Court made it clear that "state(s) must, as a matter of equal
protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense
or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners." It is
equally evident that if a defendant is denied access to the basic tools of an
adequate defense, then he has also been denied his due process.right of a fair trial.
See Grffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). However,
what constitutes the basic tools or necessary services of an adequate defense has
not been clearly defined, Britt v. North Carolina, supra; State v. Coronado, 98
Idaho 421,423,565 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1977), and may indeed vary fro111 case to
case. See State v. Powers, 96 Idaho at 838, 537 P.2d at 1374. Consequently, in
order to determine under I.C.5 19-852(a) whether the requested services in the
present case were necessary in order to provide the defendant with an adequate
defense, we must review the requests individually.

Then again, in State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,65, 90 P.3d 278,290 (2003), the Idaho
Supreme Court spoke on this subject, stating:
The constitution does not require a state to provide expert or investigative
assistance merely because a defendant requests it. State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391,
648 P.2d 203 (1982), citing United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561,
568,73 S.Ct. 391,395,97 L.Ed. 549,556 (1953). A defendant's request for
expeit or investigative seivices should be reviewed in light of a11 circuinstances
and be measured against the standard of "fundamental fairness" embodied in the
due process clause. Id., citing Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297,298 (10th Cir.
1966). Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a particular purpose
in an indigent's defense, the trial court must determine whether the funds are
necessary in the interest ofjustice. State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833,838, 537 P.2d
1369, 1374 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1089,96 S.Ct. 881,47 L.Ed.2d 99
(1976). Such a review necessarily involves the exercise of the sound discretion of
the trial court, and a denial of a request for investigative assistance will not be
disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a
decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of the
case. State v. Olin, supra.
Most recently, in State v. Marlin, --- P.3d ----,
2008 WL 2670190, *6 (2008), the Idaho
Court of Appeals held there was no substantive difference between the standard set forth in Ake
and the standard articulated in Olin and Lovelace. Nevertheless, in a show of deference to the
United States Supreme Court, the Martin Court proceeded under the Ake standard and held that
"a derendant seeking assistance at state expense must make a threshold showing that the
assistance has probable value to address what will be a significant factor at trial, such that the
accuracy of the jury's detem~inationwould be called into question if the assistance were denied."
Id. (citations omitted). Or put differently, "a defendant generally must inform the trial court of
the nature of the prosecution's case and the evidence linking him to the crime, as it relates to the
requested assistance." Id. (citations omitted)

In this case, Mr. Nevarez made such a showing. On March 9,2008, at the hearing upon
Mr. Nevarez's Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness, counsel for Mr. Nevarez,
as well as counsel for a co-defendant, set forth before Judge Melanson the factual background of
the case and the evidence that had been produced at the preliminary hearing. AF Tr. pp. 5-9.
Counsel expressed they had great difficulty accepting the testimony of Deputy Moore and
believed it was impossible for him to testify with such specificity about what he purportedly
observed on a darlc night, in a fraction of a second, with his patrol vehicle passing the defendants'
vehicle at a closing speed of 77 miles per hour. AF Tr. p. 6. Without Deputy Moore's
questionable observations, the stop and seizure ofthe defendants' vehicle could not be justified
because there were no traffic laws violated.
The importance of this defense was unequivocally conveyed to the district court. AF Tr.
pp. 7-9. As stated by counsel for a co-defendant, "[tlhe only way I can defend against [the
justification for the stop] is to present my defense by way of an expert, to challenge the particular
factual findings that we already know the officer has made." AF Tr. p. 15. Thus, Mr. Nevarez
and his co-defendant sought to retain the expertise of Marc Green, Ph.D., a forensic vision and
perception expert.
The prosecuting attorney himself acknowledged the determination of whether reasonable
and articulable suspicion existed was critical to the defense and therefore the veracity of Deputy
Moore and his ability to observe certain details was likely determinative of Mr. Nevarez's motion
to suppress. AF Tr. p. 12. Moreover, the prosecuting attorney agreed Dr. Green was qualified to
speak about the issue at hand but nevertheless took the position that his testimony would not
assist the trier of fact. Furthermore, the prosecuting attorney argued that allowing Mr. Nevarez to

retain an expert witness at state expense would be "an excessive use of the State's money . . . ."

AF Tr. p. 11. Still, Mr. Nevarez sufficiently informed the district court of the nature of the
State's case and the evidence against him, as well as how the assistance of Dr. Green could call
into question Deputy Moore's testimony.
2. The district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Nevarez 's request for an expert
at state expense.
Judge Melanson subsequently denied Mr. Nevarez's motion in a memorandum decision
concluding Dr. Green's testimony would not assist the trier of fact. R. 131-37. The decision to
do so is not supported by the circumstances of this case and as a result was clearly erroneous. At
110

point was it suggested that Dr. Green would express an opinion upon the credibility of Deputy

Moore. Rather, Dr. Green would have provided information regarding a person's capabilities as
they relate to perception and vision in different environments. See R. 107-116 (Marc Green,
Ph.D., curriculum vitae). This testimony would have assisted the trier of fact in judging the
veracity of the testimony.
Additionally, the court's decision to deny Mr. Nevarez's motioil pursuant to I.R.E. 702
was untimely and based upon the application of the wrong standard. Having not been granted the
opportunity to even retain Dr. Green as an expert or consultant, any determination as to whether
his testimony would be admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 702 was premature.
In denying the motion, Judge Melanson cited State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 81 P.3d 1220
(2003), for the proposition that "[ilt is the fact-finder's function to judge the credibility of
witnesses." R. 137. That case is not apposite. In Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court was asked
whether I.R.E. 702 precluded a polygrapher from testifying about a polygraph examinatioil taken

by the defendant. The proffered evidence was that the defendant had passed the polygraph and
thus was telling the truth. Contrary to the analysis in Perry, the issue before Judge Melanson was
whether Mr. Nevarez should be permitted to retail1 an expert witness with state fuilds under
section 19-852(a) of the Idaho Code, not whether the officer was being truthful. Instead, without
even having had the opportuility to retain Dr. Green, Judge Melanson denied Mr. Nevarez's
motion in a collclusory fashion stating, "[tjhe court finds that denial of the services for an expert
witness at this stage of the proceedings will not deny the defendant of the fuildamental fairness
required by the due process clause. Therefore, an expenditure of funds for that purpose is not
necessary in the interest of justice." R. 137. By applying the incorrect standard Judge Melanson
abused his discretion and denied Mr. Nevarez his right to fundamental fairness.
Finally, Mr. Nevarez was prejudiced by the decision denying him the opportunity to
retain Dr. Green. At the motion to suppress hearing the prosecuting attorney argued the
testimony of Deputy Green was uncontroverted. MS Tr. p. 65. Interestingly, at the previously
held hearing upon Mr. Nevarez's motion lor the apportionment of funds he took a different
position, stating:
[M]y suggestion would be that we have the suppressioil hearing, call the witnesses
and have the testimony. If after the court's heard the testimony, there's nothing
wrong with the court at that point saying I need an expert to help me dissect this
information and determine whether or not this could happen or whether this
officer could make those observations.
AF Tr. p. 12. Judge Wood, unaware of the prosecuting attorney's proposal because he did not
preside over that previous hearing, accepted the state's argument and adopted the facts as set
forth by Deputy Moore; nevertheless, he suggested Mr. Nevarez appeal the decisions because
they were made by two separate judges. MS Tr. pp. 78-79

As stated by the Supreme Court in Ake, where as here, "the interests of the individual and
the State in an accurate proceeding are substantial, the State's interest in its fisc must yield."
Ake, at 83. The decision denying Mr. Nevarez his entitlement to state appointed assistance of an

expert witness violated his constitutional right to present a defense. Moreover, the decision was
in error in light of t11e circulnstances and an abuse of discretion that infringed upon Mr.
Nevarez's right to fundamental fairness. Mr. Nevarez was not given the opportunity to present
his defense at the most critical time in the proceedings against him. Therefore, the district
court's decision denying him the assistance of an expert witness at state expense must be
overturned.
B. The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Nevarez's Motion to S u ~ ~ r e s s .
011

appeal from the district court's decision on a motion to suppress, this Court defers to

the findings of fact only when they are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the
record. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53,961 P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998); State v. Kimball,
141 Idaho 489,491, 111 P.3d 625,627 (Ct. App. 2005). This Court freely reviews the trial
court's determination as to whether, on the facts presented, constitutional standards were
violated. DuValt, 131 Idaho at 552-53,961 P.2d at 643-44; Kirnball, 141 Idaho at 491, 111 P.3d
at 627.
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and
implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasollahle searches and seizures, as
applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561, 916
P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996); citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 (1979) and
State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 809 P.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1991). "Although a vehicle stop is

limited in magnitude coinpared to other types of seizures, it is nonetheless a 'constitutionally
cognizable' intrusioil and therefore may not be conducted 'at the unbridled discretion of law
enforcement officials."' State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 160 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Ct. App. 2007);
citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661 (1979). Therefore, in order to comport wit11 constitutional
requirements, an officer is only permitted to stop a vehicle if a reasonable and articulable
suspicion exists that the vehicle was being driven contrary to traffic laws or that the driver was
wanted for detention on some other criminal matter. State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205,208,953
P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). Or in the context of an officer knowing a serious crime has just
been committed, "the question is narrowed to whether there is a reasonable suspicion that the
person under observation is connected with the crime." State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 130, 44
P.3d 1180, 1185 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State i. Gascon, 119 Idaho 923, 928, 81 1 P.2d 1103,
1108 (Ct. App. 1989)).
In either context, "[tlhe reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause,
but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." Id.; citing State v.
Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10,12,878 P.2d 184, 186 (Ct. App. 1994) and State v. Emory, 119 Idaho
661, 664, 809 P.2d 522,525 (Ct. App. 1991). Furthermore, the reasonableness of the suspicion
is judged by the totality of the circumstances at the time the stop is initiated using an objective
standard. Id.; citing Naccarato, 126 Idaho at 12, 878 P.2d a1 186 and Mason v. Dept. ofLaw
Enforcement, 103 Idaho 748,750,653 P.2d 803,805 (Ct. App. 1982). Finally, the State bears
the burden in demonstrating reasonable suspicion existed for a traffic stop. State v. Kimball, 141
Idaho 489,491, 111 P.3d 625,627 (2005).

1. Deputy Moore did not have reasonable and articuable suspicion to effectuate a tvaffic
stop and seize the vehicle operated by Mv. Nevarez.
111this case, reasonable and articuiable suspicion simply did not exist. To begin, Deputy

Moore provided absolutely no testimony pertaining to the violation of a traffic law. n
! fact,
Judge Wood expressly found the stop of the vehicle was not premised upon any "observable
violations of law in the presence of the officer. That didn't happen." MS Tr. 75. Therefore, the
seizure in this case cannot be justified upon the violation of a traffic law or other crime
committed in Deputy Moore's, or any other law enforcement officer's, presence and must satisfy
constitutional requirements elsewhere.
Arguably, the stop could be justified if Deputy Moore possessed a reasonable suspicion
that one of the individuals in the vehicle was connected to the robbery of the Maverilc store. Put
differently, the question becomes whether Deputy Moore had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the four people stopped and seized were the robbers given the informatioil at hand
about the robbe~yand the robbers before the vehicle was stopped. Again, the seizure in this case
callnot be justified because reasonable suspicion did not exist.
The infomation possessed by Deputy Moore at the time of the stop was that two
Hispanic individuals with hooded sweatshirts, bandannas, stoclcing caps and a dark pistol had
just robbed the Maverik store in Rupert. MS Tr. p. 27. There was no mention of the gender of
the suspects or whether a vehicle was involved. Nevertheless, with this description at hand,
Deputy Moore observed a vehicle approximately seven minutes later containing four Hispanic
individuals with bald heads. MS Tr. p. 36. The only similarity to this observation and the
informati011 given in the all-call is the reported ethnicity of the individuals, something Deputy

Moore admitted is not unusual in Minidolta County. MS Tr. pp. 60-61. Deputy Moore did not
observe hooded sweatshi~ts,bandannas, stocking caps, 07 a weapon. T l ~ number
e
of iildividuals
observed was also different. The people observed by Deputy Moore in the vehicle he eventually
stopped and seized did not match nor come close lo matching the description of the individuals
connected to the robbery.
Perhaps because the details in the all-call by dispatch and his obseivations were anything
but a match, Deputy Moore attempted to bootstrap reasonable suspicion into existence by stating
he was able to obseive the four individuals "look at me and [with] varying expressions" followed
by "quite a bit of movement, turning around [and] looking." MS Tr. pp. 37-38. These
observations were admittedly made in a fraction of a second. MS Tr. p. 55. Still, Deputy Moore
suggested these movements were "furtive."' Besides the fact that what Deputy Moore
purportedly observed was in fact the opposite of being furtive, any inference of nervousness
attributable to Mr. Nevarez and the three others in his vehicle is of little value and does not give
rise to a finding of reasonable suspicion. State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431,435, 146 P.3d 697,701
(Ct. App. 2006). Similarly, driving late at night is a lawful activity and does not give rise to
reasoilable suspicion. See State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1010, 783 P.2d 874, 877 (Ct. App.
1989).

In spite of this, Judge Wood, referencing State v. Gscon, 119 Idaho 932,812 P.2d 439
(1991), found reasonable suspicion existed by a "razor thin" margin. MS Tr. p. 79. Such a

' Furtive is defined as "done or acting in a stealthy manner, as if to hinder observation;
surreptitious; stealthy; sneaky." Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition
(1978), p. 567.

finding is in error and violates established constitutional standards. Moreover, any reliance upon
Gascon is misplaced.

In Gascon, law ellforcement was informed that a bank in Twin Falls had been robbed by a
"man approximately five feet four inches, with blonde hair wearing a baseball cap and jacket."
Gascon, 119 Idaho at 933,812 P.2d at 240. In response, law enforcement immediately set up a

laadblock on the roadway which provided the quicltest route to the interstate highway. Shortly
thereafter a vehicle, being driven by a11 individual matching the general description, sans baseball
cap and jacket, was seen approaching the roadblock leaning over in his vehicle. Though the
central issue was whether the roadblock was lawful, the Gascon Court nonetheless held, without
citation to any legal authority whatsoever, that in light of the circumstai~cesthe investigatory stop
in that case was proper. Id. at 934, 812 P.2d at 241.
The circumstances present in Gascon included: the correct number of suspects; matching
gender and general descriptioil of suspect; proximity to robbery location on a roadway which is
the quickest route to the interstate highway; and suspicious movements observed by law
e~~forcement.
Again, in this case, the only confirmed detail from the general description was the
reported ethnicity of the suspects. The number of suspects did not match, there was no reference
to the gender of the suspects, and the clothing description could not be confirmed. Moreover, the
vehicle seized by Deputy Moore was not traveling on the quicltest route to the interstate highway,
instead it was miles from the robbery location traveling on one of four major roadways leaving
Rupert. Though at first glance Gascon appears to be similar to the circumstances in this case,
upon close analysis it becomes evident they are quite different and distinguishable.

Moreover, even if Gascon were indistinguishable from this case, it was improperly
decided and should be overturned or limited to solely the facts presented in that case. The rule of
stave decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed unless it is manifestly wrong, has

proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principals of law and remedy continued injustice. State v. Dean, 137 Idaho 6 , 9,43 P.3d
765,768 (2002).
As pointed out in Justice Bistline's dissent in Gascon, the majority improperly framed the
issue as "whether the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Gascon could have
been the banlc robber." Gascon, 119 Idaho at 940, 812 P.2d at 247, n. 4 (emphasis in original).
Instead, the majority should have asked "whether the police had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the person who they stopped and seized was the bank robber." Id. at 940, 812 P.2d
at 247. The analysis used by the Gascon Court is manifestly wrong and encourages reasonable
suspicion analysis to delve into the regrettable and impermissible realm of speculation and
hunches.
Furthennore, as noted above, the majority's opinion fails to cite any legal authority in
determining whether the seizure of Gascon's vehicle was proper. See Id. at 934, 812 P.2d at 241.
Doing so is unjust and unwise. But most importantly, doing so has resulted in confusion and
disruption to well settled principles of constitutional law that have led to continued injustice as
evidenced by this case. The flaw in Gascon is that it holds, in essence, that law enforcement can
seize drivers in this state for "ilmocuous activity." See Id. at 940, 812 P.2d at 247 (J. Bistline,
dissenting). Gascon is illogical and must be overturned or limited to solely the facts presented in
that case.

In sum, reasonable suspicion does not exist when the occupants of a car happen to be the
same ethnicity as suspects in a crime even when the occupants purportedly engage in non-furtive
activity. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, and in light of the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the stop, there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
i~idividualsin the vehicle were the robbers of the Maverik store in Rupert at the time Deputy
Moore effectuated a trafic stop. Because the stop was unsupported by a warrant, probable cause,
or even reasonable and articulable suspicion, the seizure was unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the district court's decision
denying Mr. Nevarez's Motion to Suppress and grant the motion. Alternatively, it should reverse
the district court's denial of the Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness and
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings
1
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